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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
    recision attacks dominate contemporary aerial warfare. The centrality of 
precision operations derives not only from their military utility, but also 
from the international community’s evolving expectations with respect to 
the avoidance of collateral damage. As technological developments in the 
field proceed apace, the emphasis on precision can only be expected to 
grow.   
This article examines the synergistic relationship between precision air-
strikes and the law of armed conflict. It defines precision, briefly reviews 
the history of its rise to prominence in aerial warfare, examines the applica-
tion of the law of armed conflict to precision attacks and considers several 
new precision weapon systems. In sum, the article explores both how the 
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law of armed conflict governs the use of precision capabilities and how ad-
vances in precision capabilities are likely to shape the law of armed conflict.   
 
II. THE DEFINITION OF “PRECISION” AND A BRIEF HISTORY 
 
A. “Precision” Defined 
 
“Precision” refers to the “ability to locate and identify a target, strike it ac-
curately in a timely fashion, and determine whether desired effects have 
been achieved or restrike is needed.”1 In discussing precision, many schol-
ars address only accuracy. “Accuracy” refers to a weapon’s capacity to 
strike a specific aimpoint2 and is an integral aspect of any precision air-
strike.   
But accuracy alone is insufficient to render a strike “precise.” Precision 
is just as dependent on command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (known as C4ISR) capabili-
ties.  In fact, on a complex battlefield, ISR,3 not accuracy, often proves the 
key aspect of a precision airstrike. For example, during Operation Endur-
ing Freedom U.S. aircraft twice mistakenly attacked International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross warehouses.4 Weapons accuracy played no role in the 
attacks—the missiles landed exactly where they were aimed. Instead, the 
problem was a failure in the targeting process, which is C4ISR driven.   
It is likewise important to recognize that the environment in which an 
airstrike takes place can affect the accuracy of a weapon system and the 
quality of the associated C4ISR. For instance, nighttime or inclement 
                                                                                                                      
1. Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 445, 446 (2005).  
2. An “aimpoint” is “[a] point associated with a target and assigned for a specific 
weapon impact. [It] may be defined descriptively (e.g., vent in center of roof), by grid ref-
erence, or geolocation. More specific classifications of aimpoint include desired point of 
impact, joint desired point of impact, and desired mean point of impact.” Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Nov. 8, 
2010), as amended through July 15, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary 
[hereinafter DoD Dictionary]. 
3. “[I]ntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” is “[a]n activity that synchronizes 
and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, 
and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an 
integrated intelligence and operations function.” Id.  
4. For a discussion of these incidents, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
247 (2002). 
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weather limits the effectiveness of certain weapon systems. Fire can dimin-
ish the usefulness of infrared equipment and smoke may prevent visual tar-
get identification, as was demonstrated during coalition airstrikes in the 
1990–1991 Gulf War after Kuwaiti oil wells were set ablaze by Iraqi forces.  
If a target is heavily defended, an attacker may be forced to launch from a 
greater-than-optimal weapons release altitude or range or conduct evasive 
maneuvers that make the launch platform unsteady. And, of course, human 
error is always possible in the heat of battle. 
  
B. Rise of Precision Airstrikes 
 
Airpower played no significant role in armed conflict until World War I, 
when it was initially employed for surveillance and reconnaissance; the first 
aerial attacks took the form of close air support for ground forces. Later in 
the conflict, belligerents began to use aircraft for strategic strikes, most no-
tably in the zeppelin raids against London.5 By 1918, the U.S. Air Service 
and the American Expeditionary Force had drafted a strategic bombing 
plan which involved “drop[ping] aerial bombs upon commercial centers 
and the lines of communications in such quantities as will wreck the points 
aimed at and cut off the necessary supply lines.”6 The war ended before the 
plan could be executed. 
In the aftermath of World War I, most air forces engaged in compre-
hensive doctrine reviews. The United States, for example, conducted the 
U.S. Bombing Survey, which concluded that the “successful application of 
airpower requires a predetermined plan calculated to destroy the enemy’s 
will and war sustaining capability. Achieving this goal requires systematic 
analysis to determine which targets, if destroyed, would do the greatest 
damage to the enemy.”7 In a sense, the Bombing Survey argued for what 
would at the end of the century come to be known as “effects-based opera-
tions.”8 Conducting operations to achieve particular results, rather than 
simply wearing down the enemy’s fielded forces, requires that an attacker 
                                                                                                                      
5. For an in-depth history of airpower, see STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, AIR POWER: THE 
MEN, MACHINES, AND IDEAS THAT REVOLUTIONIZED WAR, FROM KITTY HAWK TO 
GULF WAR II (2004). 
6. U.S. Air Force, AF Pamphlet 14-210, Intelligence Targeting Guide, AF Pamphlet 
14-210, attachment 2 (Feb. 1, 1998).  See this attachment generally for a summary of air-
power theory development. 
7. Id. 
8. See, e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, I-
1 (Jan. 17, 2002). 
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deconstruct enemy systems in order to identify those objectives the de-
struction of which will achieve specific desired effects. Precision makes this 
possible.9 
At the time of the U.S. Bombing Survey, the precision technology ca-
pable of accomplishing such missions was years from development. During 
World War II, for example, a B-17 had a circular error probable10 of rough-
ly 3,300 feet.  This meant that at 6,500 feet, approximately 9,000 bombs 
from 1,500 aircraft would have to be dropped to achieve a high probability 
of destroying a point target.11 Complicating matters was the fact that mis-
sions often were flown at night and at high altitude to avoid enemy air de-
fenses, thereby further diminishing the precision of the attacks.   
Air operations during the Vietnam conflict marked a sea change in pre-
cision warfare. A new generation of laser-guided weapons finally enabled a 
single aircraft to destroy a target in one attack.  Since the Vietnam conflict, 
dramatic technological advances have continued with respect to both preci-
sion weapons and C4ISR capabilities. The result has been a sharp rise in 
the percentage of airstrikes that employ precision systems. For example, 
precision munitions were used in only 8.8 percent of attacks during Opera-
tion Desert Storm (1991).12 By the initial phases of Operation Enduring 
                                                                                                                      
9. Michael N. Schmitt, Effects-Based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare, 5 WASH-
INGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW 265, 276 (2006). 
10. “[C]ircular error probable” is “[a]n indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon 
system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a 
circle within which half of a missile’s projectiles are expected to fall. Also called CEP.” 
DoD Dictionary, supra note 2. 
11. Colonel Gary L. Crowder, Chief of Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine, Department 
of Defense Air Combat Command, Effects Based Operations Briefing (Mar. 19, 2003), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2067. As another 
example,  
 
during Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy, U.S. air forces dropped 
14,600 500-pound bombs on one German division, destroying 66 tanks and 11 heavy 
guns. During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. dropped 9,800 precision-guided mu-
nitions, destroying 2,500 tanks, heavy artillery pieces, and armoured personnel carri-
ers—a ratio of bombs to destruction of equipment 50 times greater than in Opera-
tion Cobra. 
 
Robert A. Pape, Hit or Miss: What Precision Air Weapons Do, Precisely, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Sept./Oct. 2004, at 162, 163. 
12. WILLIAM M. ARKIN ET AL., GREENPEACE, ON IMPACT: MODERN WARFARE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT, A CASE STUDY OF THE GULF WAR 78 (1991).  
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Freedom (2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), those figures were at 
65 percent and 68 percent, respectively.13 
Technology has progressed to the point where a basic precision strike 
capability is within the reach of even less advanced militaries. A prime ex-
ample is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which is simply an un-
guided bomb to which a guidance tail kit has been attached. At $22,000 per 
kit, the JDAM is relatively uncomplicated and cheap.14 JDAMs are also fair-
ly accurate, allowing for a precision airstrike with a circular error probable 
of less than twenty feet from as far away as fifteen miles.15   
Beyond their obvious utility in conventional warfare, precision air-
strikes are particularly useful in air campaigns where the objective is not 
mere attrition of the enemy’s armed forces. The best example is compel-
lance (or coercive) warfare, in which the objective is to induce an adversary 
to engage in, or desist from, particular behavior. NATO adopted this ap-
proach during Operation Allied Force, the 1999 air campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The goal of that campaign was to force 
President Slobodan Milosevic to resume negotiations and end the mis-
treatment of the Kosovar-Albanian population by his forces.16 To achieve 
these objectives, NATO relied on precision airstrikes to attack specific tar-
gets, the destruction of which it believed would convince Milosevic to re-
turn to the bargaining table and stop the slaughter. The campaign succeed-
ed in seventy-eight days.17 
Counterinsurgency conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, al-
so necessitate precision military operations that go beyond destroying the 
enemy’s fielded forces.18 Modern counterinsurgency operations aim to 
safeguard the State’s government, infrastructure and civilian population, 
                                                                                                                      
13. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: BY THE 
NUMBERS 11 (2003). 
14. U.S. Air Force, Factsheet on Joint Direct Attack Munition, GBU-31/32/38, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=108. 
15. Id. 
16. See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Situation In and 
Around Kosovo: Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council (Apr. 12, 1999), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm. 
17. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTER-
ACTION REPORT xvii (2000). 
18. See generally HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY & HEADQUARTERS, 
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUN-
TERINSURGENCY (2006).  
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while waging war against a discrete group within that State.19 As a result, 
counterinsurgency air operations emphasize limiting collateral damage, es-
pecially civilian casualties, usually at a level far below law of armed conflict 
requirements. Moreover, airstrikes often target particular insurgents within 
a group’s command and control structure in order to weaken that group’s 
ability to operate cohesively. Since these insurgents often operate among 
the civilian population, their targeting is operationally challenging and usu-
ally only accomplishable through air operations when advanced precision 
capabilities are available.  
Looking toward the future, precision airstrikes will play an ever-
increasing role in warfare. Beyond their military utility in terms of finding, 
fixing, and destroying enemy forces, airstrikes also reduce the risk to the 
attacker’s forces.  New weapon systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles, 
air-based cyber-attack platforms and autonomous systems will further 
those goals. Of course, as precision attack takes center stage in twenty-first-
century warfare, so too will issues as to the law of armed conflict that gov-
erns such operations.  
 
III. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT GOVERNING PRECISION AIRSTRIKES 
 
The development of precision airstrike capabilities occurred as the law of 
armed conflict governing the conduct of hostilities, especially the protec-
tion of civilians and civilian objects, began to achieve maturity. Of particu-
lar note is the 1977 Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which represented the first codification of such key principles and rules as 
distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.20 Although the Pro-
tocol does not encompass all aspects of air warfare, it expressly applies to 
“attacks from . . . the air against objectives on land.”21 Among States pos-
sessing robust precision attack capabilities, the United States and Israel 
stand out as non-parties to the treaty.  However, both States recognize the 
                                                                                                                      
19. Id. at 5-1 (“Successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with 
legitimacy and the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, 
and security. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal ten-
sions, and injustice. As such, they defy nonviolent solutions.”). 
20. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51 and 57, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
21. Id., art. 49(3).  
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core targeting principles and rules set forth therein as generally reflective of 
customary international law.22   
In 2010, a major multiyear research effort sponsored by Harvard Uni-
versity’s Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research and led by 
Professor Yoram Dinstein produced the Manual on International Law Appli-
cable to Air and Missile Warfare (AMW Manual).23 The work, authored by a 
group of distinguished international law experts and practitioners, repre-
sents an unofficial, yet authoritative, restatement of the principles and rules 
governing aerial operations. In its examination of the key legal issues sur-
rounding precision aerial warfare, this article relies heavily on both the 
AMW Manual and Additional Protocol I as key repositories of the applica-
ble law.  
 
A. Prohibited Weapon Systems 
 
Certain weapon systems and individual weapons are prohibited in aerial 
warfare irrespective of how they are used or the results their use generates. 
First, only military aircraft may be used to conduct airstrikes; airstrikes by 
civilian aircraft are unlawful regardless of how precise they might be.24 Sec-
ond, the law of armed conflict forbids the employment of particular weap-
ons on military aircraft even when they are capable of striking a lawful tar-
get with great precision and without risk to civilians and civilian objects.  
These include the following:  
 
(a) Biological, including bacteriological, weapons[;] 
(b) Chemical weapons[;] 
(c) Laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function  
     or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness  
     to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with  
     corrective eyesight devices[;] 
                                                                                                                      
22. See, e.g., U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Marine Corps, NWP 1-
14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The Commander's Handbook on the Law 
of Naval Operations ch. 8 (2007) (reiterating most of the Additional Protocol I targeting 
rules). 
23. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter 
AMW MANUAL].  Professor Schmitt served as one of the members of the drafting team 
for the manual. 
24. Id., rule 17(a) (“Only military aircraft, including UCAVs, are entitled to engage in 
attacks.”). 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2013 
676 
 
(d) Poison, poisoned substances and poisoned weapons[;] 
(e) Small arms projectiles calculated, or of a nature, to cause explosion  
     on impact with or within the human body[; and] 
(f) Weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments  
     which in the human body escape detection by x-ray.25 
 
B. The Principle of Distinction 
 
The principle of distinction was set forth as early as the 1868 St. Petersburg 
Declaration,26 adopted in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations,27 and codi-
fied in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I. The International Court of Jus-
tice has described it as one of the two “cardinal” principles of the law of 
armed conflict.28 The International Committee of the Red Cross has la-
beled it the “foundation on which the codification of the laws and customs 
of war rests.”29  
By the principle, parties to a conflict must distinguish between combat-
ants and military objectives on the one hand and civilians and civilian ob-
jects on the other.30 Once this distinction has been made, they may only 
attack those targets that qualify as military objectives, combatants, or civil-
ians directly participating in hostilities.31 In case of doubt as to the targeta-
bility of an individual under the law of armed conflict, an individual must 
be treated as a civilian immune from attack.32 Precision lies at the heart of 
                                                                                                                      
25. Id., rule 6(a)–(f). 
26. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 
400 Grammes Weight pmbl. ¶ 2, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 (“That the only le-
gitimate objects which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy.”). 
27. Convention [II] with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with an-
nex of regulations arts. 22, 29, 32, July 29, 1899, Stat. 1803, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247; 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention 
No. 4 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277, 1 Bevans 631. 
28. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 78 (July 8). 
29. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 1863 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].  
30. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 48.  
31. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 10. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 
20, arts. 51(2), 51(3) and 52(1). 
32. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 50(1); see also AMW MANUAL, supra note 
23, rule 12; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMEN-
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the principle of distinction because, as noted, precision involves more than 
simply striking a particular point (accuracy); it involves hitting the right tar-
get in the right way. Therefore, target identification is of paramount im-
portance for both precision warfare and the principle of distinction.  
Military objectives, the first category subject to lawful attack, are those 
“objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a defi-
nite military advantage.”33 This definition has two express criteria. First, the 
object must make an “effective contribution” to enemy operations. While 
this criterion by no means requires that the contribution be “significant,” 
the object “must in fact contribute to the enemy’s military action.”34 Sec-
ond, the military advantage gained by targeting the object must be “defi-
nite.” This requires that the advantage not be “merely potential, speculative 
or indeterminate.”35 ISR is often a necessary component in determining 
whether these two criteria have been satisfied. If they are not satisfied, then 
the operation in question is neither a precision strike nor a lawful attack. 
Despite universal acceptance of the textual definition of “military ob-
jective” set out above, controversy persists over its parameters. Clearly, 
“war-fighting” targets qualify, as do those that are “war-supporting,” such 
as factories producing munitions or military equipment. However, the 
United States has taken the position that the term also encompasses “eco-
nomic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and sus-
tain the enemy’s war-fighting capability.”36 This definition is not widely ac-
cepted, as some expert commentators claim it “goes too far” because it 
does not require the objective to have a “proximate nexus to military ac-
tion.”37   
                                                                                                                      
TARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MIS-
SILE WARFARE rule 12(a) cmts. 3 and 4 (2010) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL COMMEN-
TARY]. 
33. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(y). This definition is based on Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 52(2). 
34. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(y) cmt. 4. 
35. Id., rule 1(y) cmt. 7. See also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2024. 
36. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS 402–3 (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, U.S. 
Naval War College International Law Studies) (describing this as a “statement of custom-
ary international law”). 
37. Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under the Current Jus In Bello, LEGAL 
AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 139, 145–46 (Andru E. Wall ed., 
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There are four different ways in which an object may fulfill the two ex-
press criteria (i.e., “effective contribution” and “definite military ad-
vantage”)—through its “nature, location, purpose or use.” “Nature” de-
notes “an inherent characteristic or attribute which contributes to military 
action.”38 This would include all military equipment and facilities. “Loca-
tion” relates to “selected areas that have special importance to military op-
erations,”39 regardless of how those areas are currently being used. A com-
monly cited example is a mountain pass that, if blocked, would halt an en-
emy’s advance. 
“Use” refers to the present function of an object. Those objects that do 
not qualify as military objectives by “nature” become military objectives by 
“use” when employed for military purposes, but only for so long as they 
are so employed. For example, a civilian vehicle may be attacked if enemy 
forces commandeer it to transport troops, but not once it is returned to its 
civilian owner.40 Lastly, “purpose” focuses on the future use of an object.  
It recognizes that “an attacker need not wait until an object is actually used 
for military ends before being allowed to attack it as a military objective.”41 
Since “purpose” depends on the attacker’s perception of the enemy’s in-
tent, and since the enemy’s intent is not always clear, the attacker must act 
reasonably.42 The ability to observe a potential target to determine whether 
it qualifies as a military objective on one of these four bases is a critical el-
                                                                                                                      
2002) (Vol. 78, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). On the other hand, 
some commentators have argued that the term “military objective” should be interpreted 
even more broadly. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap Jr., The End of Innocence: Rethinking Noncom-
batancy in the Post-Kosovo Era, STRATEGIC REVIEW, Summer 2000, at 9, 14);  Jeanne M. 
Meyer, Tearing Down the Façade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the 
Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 143 (2001). 
38. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(a) cmt. 1; see also ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2020. 
39. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(b) cmt; see also ICRC COM-
MENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2021. 
40. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(d) cmt. 1; see also ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2022. 
41. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(c) cmt. 1; ICRC COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2022. 
42. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(c) cmt. 3 (“The attacker 
must always act reasonably, i.e. as would be proper under a similar set of circumstances 
for any other Belligerent Party. In other words, the attacker must ask itself whether it 
would be reasonable to conclude that the intelligence was reliable enough to conduct the 
attack in light of the circumstances ruling at the time.”). 
 
 
 
Precision Air Warfare Vol. 89 
 
679 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ement of target identification that is often made possible by advanced pre-
cision capabilities, most notably ISR. 
Like military objectives, combatants are lawful targets and, as with the 
former, precision capabilities are often a key to their proper identification.  
Combatants are “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict 
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such 
armed forces,”43 excluding “medical or religious personnel.”44 Members of 
other militias or volunteer corps are also combatants when they fulfill the 
following cumulative conditions:  
 
(a) Are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;  
(b) Have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;  
(c) Carry their arms openly; and 
(d) Conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs   
            of war.45 
 
Note that the term “combatant” is used to describe only participants in 
an international armed conflict (i.e., a conflict between States). However, 
“like members of the regular armed forces of the State concerned, mem-
bers of a non-State organized armed group in a non-international armed 
conflict are lawful targets.”46  
Civilians directly participating in hostilities may also be targeted.47 This 
norm was the subject of a five-year International Committee of the Red 
Cross project that led to the 2009 publication of the Interpretive Guidance on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law.48 Of particular importance is the Guidance’s delineation of the consti-
                                                                                                                      
43. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; see also AMW MANUAL 
COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b)(i) cmt. 1. 
44. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b)(i) cmt. 2. 
45. Geneva Convention III, supra note 43, art. 4(A)(2). See also AMW MANUAL COM-
MENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b)(i) cmt. 2. 
46. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b); see also NILS MELZER, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE 
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW 36 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]. 
47. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 51(3); see also Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; AMW 
MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 28. 
48. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 46. 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2013 
680 
 
tutive elements of direct participation. By that standard, an act qualifying an 
individual as a direct participant “must be likely to adversely affect the mili-
tary operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alter-
natively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects pro-
tected against direct attack.”49 There must also be a causal connection be-
tween the act and the harm and the act must exhibit belligerent nexus.50 
Controversy remains over both the precise criteria for determining that a 
civilian is directly participating in hostilities51 and as to when the direct par-
ticipant may be lawfully attacked.52 Despite these debates, the premise that 
civilians directly participating in hostilities may be targeted is widely accept-
ed, and precision technology is invaluable in determining whether a civilian 
is participating as such. 
 
C. Prohibition against Indiscriminate Attack 
 
The law of armed conflict prohibits indiscriminate attacks, which are 
“those that cannot be or are not directed against lawful targets . . . or the 
effects of which cannot be limited as required by the law of international 
armed conflict, and which therefore are of a nature to strike lawful targets 
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”53 In other words, the 
                                                                                                                      
49. Id. at 47. 
50. Id. at 46–64. 
51. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 29 cmt. 5. 
52. Id., rule 28 cmt. 3.  For a more robust examination of the various points of con-
tention, see, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 641 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing 
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 697 (2010); Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time 
As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 741 (2010); W. Hays Parks, Part IX of 
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incor-
rect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 769 
(2010); Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 
42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2010). 
53. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 13 (b); See also Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 20, art. 54. For the prohibition on indiscriminate attack as part of customary interna-
tional law, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 463 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (holding that firing high-dispersion 
non-guided rockets at a densely populated civilian area constituted an indiscriminate at-
tack). 
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notion of indiscriminate attack encompasses both the use of weapons in-
capable of discriminating between lawful and unlawful targets and the use 
of weapons that, albeit capable of being directed at a lawful target, are used 
indiscriminately. Indiscriminate attacks are the antithesis of precision war-
fare.   
A violation of the prohibition against indiscriminate use of a lawful 
weapon typically involves reckless disregard for the safety of civilian per-
sons or objects.54 At its most basic level, an indiscriminate attack is one 
where the weapon system could be aimed, but the attacker fails to do so, as 
in the case of blindly dropping bombs over enemy territory. Other exam-
ples include an attack based on patently unreliable information and one in 
which the weapon is employed in an environment that causes it to be high-
ly inaccurate (e.g., at a very high altitude or in weather that disrupts guid-
ance system functionality). As these examples demonstrate, every aspect of 
a precision airstrike (accuracy, C4ISR and outside factors) can prove de-
terminative as to whether a strike is indiscriminate as a matter of law. 
The prohibition also extends to certain types of “target area” bombing 
since “[a]ttacks must not treat as a single lawful target a number of clearly 
separated and distinct lawful targets located in a city, town, village or area 
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects.”55 Com-
pliance with this norm is directly related to the precision capabilities of the 
weapon systems involved.  If those capabilities afford an attacker the op-
tion of individually attacking lawful targets in the area, it must do so. On 
the other hand, if the systems used are insufficiently precise to mount sepa-
rate attacks, the area itself may be attacked (so long as the attack comports 
with the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in 
attack). 
Use of indiscriminate weapons is likewise prohibited.56 As noted above, 
certain weapons are prohibited per se from use, often because of their in-
discriminate character.57  All other weapons are analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis.58  They may be proscribed as indiscriminate on two grounds.  
                                                                                                                      
54. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 126–28 (2010). 
55. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 13(c); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 
20, art. 51(5).   
56. The International Court of Justice has labeled the prohibition on indiscriminate 
weapons “cardinal.” Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, ¶ 105E. 
57. See AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 6. 
58. See id., rule 13(a) cmt. 2. 
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First, weapons cannot be used if they are incapable of being reliably 
aimed at a military objective.  The paradigmatic example is the German V-2 
rocket employed during World War II. Its guidance system was such that 
any attempt to use it to attack a particular military objective within its 
range, including large objectives such as military installations, would likely 
fail; a successful attack would effectively be the product of luck. The preci-
sion capabilities of most contemporary weapon systems would preclude 
them from running afoul of this prohibition. For instance, even in the case 
of unguided (gravity or “dumb”) bombs, delivery methodologies have been 
developed which provide the weapon system (aircraft and bomb) a degree 
of accuracy.   
Second, the use of weapons that have uncontrollable effects is unlaw-
ful. The most commonly cited examples are biological contagions or persis-
tent airborne chemicals that, even if accurately aimed at enemy forces, 
could easily spread to the civilian population. Both are by nature indiscrim-
inate, a fact that explains their long-standing prohibition.59   
International law’s application and understanding of the rules prohibit-
ing indiscriminate attacks will evolve with advances in precision weaponry.  
For example, while bombs dropped from a B-17 during World War II had 
a circular error probable exceeding three thousand feet, today such accura-
cy (or lack thereof) would be considered indiscriminate. In the future, it is 
plausible that unguided air-delivered weapons as such may begin to be 
characterized as violating the prohibition. 
 
D. Proportionality 
 
The rule of proportionality prohibits an “attack that may be expected to 
cause collateral damage which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated.”60 It applies when an attack 
is properly directed at a lawful target but “collateral damage” is neverthe-
                                                                                                                      
59. See AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 6; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571; Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.  
60. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 14; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, 
arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(b). For proportionality as part of customary law of armed conflict, 
see Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, ¶ 105E (Higgins, J., dissenting).  
 
 
 
Precision Air Warfare Vol. 89 
 
683 
 
 
 
 
 
 
less unavoidable. Collateral damage consists of “incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects or other protected ob-
jects or a combination thereof, caused by an attack on a lawful target.”61 
Recognized injuries do not include mere inconvenience or fear among the 
civilian population.62 While there is some dispute regarding the extent to 
which “indirect effects” of an airstrike must be taken into account when 
assessing proportionality, general agreement exists that consequences 
should not be included in the proportionality analysis if they are “too re-
mote or cannot be reasonably foreseen.”63 
Military advantage, the factor in the context of which collateral damage 
is considered, consists of “those benefits of a military nature that result 
from attack.”64 Although certain commentators argue that the term in-
cludes only “ground gained” and “annihilating or weakening the enemy 
armed forces,”65 the AMW Manual suggests the “better approach” is to in-
clude “any consequence of an attack which directly enhances friendly mili-
tary operations or hinders those of the enemy.”66  Consider a precision air-
strike that does not destroy an enemy armored column, but instead reduces 
its mobility by, for example, destroying a bridge across which it would pass. 
The AMW Manual would properly characterize the diminished mobility of 
the column as a military advantage. 
Key to correct application of the proportionality analysis is an emphasis 
on what is “expected” and “anticipated.” When performing a proportional-
ity analysis, an attacker has to anticipate the likely consequences of a strike; 
the focus is on expectations, not results. These expectations must be “rea-
sonable” in the sense that a “good faith assessment by the commander 
planning or approving the attack” would conclude that the outcome is 
“probable, i.e. more likely than not.”67 The reasonableness requirement at-
taches at every stage of an attack. Accordingly, an individual with the au-
thority or ability to suspend an attack must do so if, at any point, he or she 
concludes that an operation would cause excessive collateral damage in re-
                                                                                                                      
61. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1 (l); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 
20, art. 51(5). 
62. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(l) cmt 5. 
63. Id., rule 14 cmt. 4. 
64. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(w). 
65. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2218. 
66. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(w) cmt. 3. 
67. Id., rule 14 cmt. 6. Similarly, proportionality requires that the military advantage be 
“concrete and direct,” meaning it must be “clearly identifiable” instead of “based merely 
on hope or speculation.” Id., rule 14 cmt. 9. 
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lation to the anticipated military advantage.68 Both the commander who 
approves a mission and the aircrew that flies it would, for example, be in-
cluded. 
Precision is highly determinative of both the collateral damage and the 
military advantage that are likely to result from a strike. Attackers must 
consider such factors as the timeliness, reliability and comprehensiveness 
of target intelligence, the accuracy of the weapon system, and the effect of 
environmental factors when forming their expectations or anticipations. 
Once the collateral damage and military advantage are estimated, the at-
tacker has to determine whether the former is “excessive” relative to the 
latter. While the AMW Manual defines “excessive” as a “significant imbal-
ance,”69 it must be remembered that proportionality does not involve a 
strict mathematic balancing test. Such a test would be conceptually and 
practically impossible in that it would require commanders and others per-
forming a proportionality analysis to value and compare dissimilar entities.  
For example, how is an attacker supposed to estimate how much a tank is 
“worth” in terms of civilian deaths or civilian property damage? The exces-
siveness standard avoids the legal fiction that the value of these dissimilar 
entities can be quantified along a single axis. Instead, it bans attacks in 
which proportionality between the ends sought and the expected harm to 
civilians and civilian objects is absent altogether. Restated, the test is simply 
one of reasonableness in the prevailing circumstances. 
Since excessiveness is determined only in relation to the military ad-
vantage an attacker reasonably anticipates gaining, as the potential military 
advantage estimate grows so does the acceptable extent of likely collateral 
damage. While some have asserted that any attack resulting in “extensive” 
collateral damage is forbidden,70 this is wrong as a matter of law; there is no 
absolute threshold of collateral damage above which the rule of propor-
tionality ceases to apply and an attack is prohibited.71 Instead, proportional-
ity assessments must be made for every attack and they are always contex-
tual.72 Depending on the military advantage anticipated to result, some 
                                                                                                                      
68. Id., rule 14 cmt. 15; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 57(2)(b). 
69. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 14 cmt. 7. 
70. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 1980. 
71. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 14 cmt. 8. 
72. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, ¶ 105E (holding that 
the Court could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very 
survival of a State would be at stake”).  
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highly precise strikes may cause collateral damage that qualifies as exces-
sive, while attacks employing no precision systems may sometimes result in 
collateral damage that is not excessive in light of the military gain sought. 
Improvements in precision airstrike capabilities will unquestionably ex-
ercise a direct influence on how proportionality will be understood in fu-
ture combat operations. As noted in the context of indiscriminate attacks, 
standards generally become more restrictive with advances in precision 
technology. Therefore, as the capacity to conduct precision airstrikes 
grows, attitudes toward the acceptability of collateral damage under the law 
of armed conflict (i.e., what is considered “excessive”) will likely become 
more demanding. 
 
E. Precautions in Attack 
 
The law of armed conflict requires that “[c]onstant care must be taken to 
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”73 “Constant 
care” entails taking certain “feasible precautions” both before and during a 
strike.74 The precautions are designed to ensure, to the extent possible, that 
only lawful targets are attacked and collateral damage is minimized. The 
availability of precision capabilities affects compliance with most of the 
obligatory precautionary measures.  
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I generally codifies the specific pre-
cautions, each of which is reflected in the AMW Manual. These precautions 
need only be taken when doing so is “feasible.”  “Feasible” denotes a 
measure of precaution that “is practicable or practically possible, taking 
into account all circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitari-
an and military considerations.”75 What is considered practicable or practi-
cally possible has been described as “a matter of common sense and good 
faith.”76   
At its core, feasibility is a reasonableness standard—those who plan, 
approve or execute an attack have to undertake any measures to limit harm 
                                                                                                                      
73. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 30. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 
20, art. 57(1). 
74. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 57; AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, 
rules 30–33. 
75. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(q); see also Amended Protocol on Prohibi-
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 3(10), May 
3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.  
76. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2198. 
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to civilians and civilian objects that a reasonable warfighter in the same or 
similar circumstances would take. Of course, attackers are only required to 
take into account information that is “reasonably available”77 to them “at 
the relevant time and place.”78 Furthermore, in deciding whether a measure 
is feasible, they may factor in military considerations, such as the availability 
of precision weapons, competing demands for surveillance capabilities and 
risk to friendly forces.  
As to specific measures, attackers must first do everything feasible to 
verify that the target is a lawful one and does not benefit from specific pro-
tection.79 Determining which objectives qualify as lawful targets requires an 
attacker to utilize reasonably available ISR assets to gain information about 
the target. In particular, the “quality and timeliness of the intelligence has 
to be considered,” including the potential that the “enemy may attempt to 
provide disinformation.”80 An attacker should also assess the availability of 
other sources of intelligence, such as “on the spot” visual observations.81  
The requisite level of certainty as to target identification is not entirely 
clear.  Some commentators appear to require near certainty.82 However, 
such a standard would ignore the realities of combat, in which attackers 
operate in the fog of war. A more manageable standard that comports with 
the notion of feasibility asks whether a reasonable warfighter, having ex-
hausted all reasonably available means of verification in light of the prevail-
ing circumstances, would launch the attack. This standard allows attackers 
to balance the potential military advantage against both the likely collateral 
damage and any degree of doubt as to the objective’s status as a lawful tar-
get, just as the law of armed conflict allows military advantage to offset col-
lateral damage more generally. Obviously, precision capabilities play a key 
role in this process, especially ISR assets that allow targets to be located, 
monitored and identified. While these capabilities have immense military 
utility, they can also be constraining. If a “reasonable warfighter in the 
same or similar circumstances” would consider their use both helpful in 
                                                                                                                      
77. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 32(a). 
78. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(q) cmt. 3. 
79. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 32(a); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 
20, art. 57(2)(a)(i). 
80. See AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 32(a). cmt. 2. 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2195 (“[I]n case of doubt, even if 
there is only slight doubt, [those who plan or decide upon attack] must call for additional 
information.”). 
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identifying an objective and feasible, an attack not employing such capabili-
ties would be unlawful.   
Similarly, the requirement to take precautions in attack also mandates 
that an attacker choose from among feasible means (weapons) and meth-
ods (tactics) of warfare in order to minimize collateral damage.83 As with 
target identification, precision capabilities can act as a double-edged sword 
when complying with this required precaution. While helpful both militarily 
and in conforming to the law of armed conflict, precision capabilities can 
also force an attacker’s hand when their use is mandatory under this rule. 
After all, since precision capabilities usually allow for greater accuracy and 
lesser explosive force, their use (when available) may be required as a mat-
ter of law when the result would be less harm to civilians and civilian prop-
erty.   
This rule has two important caveats. First, States are not required to 
acquire or field precision capabilities.84 The battlefield is “come as you are” 
in the law of armed conflict. Second, even when an attacker has precision 
capabilities available and their use would limit civilian harm, employment is 
compulsory only when feasible.85 For example, precision capabilities may 
be in short supply at the time of attack. In such a situation, a commander 
may preserve some or all of his or her precision weapons for later opera-
tions, taking into account both military and humanitarian concerns. The 
paradigmatic example is retention for use in impending urban operations, 
where precision weapons will prove highly useful in avoiding collateral 
damage.  
A third key precaution in attack applies when an attacker has a choice 
between several military objectives the destruction of which would result in 
                                                                                                                      
83. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 32 (b); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 
20, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
84. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 8. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 54, at 142 
(“No [law of international armed conflict] LOIAC obligation is incumbent on Belligerent 
Parties to use expensive ‘smart bombs’ where cheaper ‘dumb bombs’ will do.”). 
85. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rules 31–32. However, some claim there is a duty 
to use precision munitions whenever available or at least in certain environments (e.g., 
urban areas). See, e.g., Stuart W. Belt., Missiles over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary 
Norm Requiring Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 115, 174 
(2000); Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in 
Desert Storm; But Is a Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian 
Injury and Damage?, 26 GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 109, 110–11 (1992).  Both assertions are wrong as the decision is 
always fully contextual. 
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a similar military advantage. In that situation, an attacker must select the 
objective which, when attacked, would involve the least danger to civilian 
lives and civilian objects or to other protected persons and objects.86 Here 
again, precision capabilities may have a restrictive effect on an attacker to 
the extent that they increase the number of potential targets that can be 
feasibly attacked. As with the other precautions though, the only objectives 
that need be considered are those on which an attack is militarily reasona-
ble. For example, imagine there are two potential targets the destruction of 
which would yield the same military advantage. One is heavily defended, 
but remote from civilians, while the other has few defenses, but is located 
in the vicinity of civilians and civilian structures. In this situation, the tar-
geting of the heavily defended objective would not be required, even 
though its destruction would offer a “similar military advantage” and cause 
less collateral damage.87 
 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: A NEW GENERATION OF 
PRECISION WEAPON SYSTEMS 
 
Three relatively new weapon systems—unmanned combat aerial vehicles 
(UCAV), autonomous weapon systems, and cyber-attack systems—have 
captured the attention of the law of armed conflict community. Each raises 
issues of precision that merit careful reflection. 
 
A. Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
 
An unmanned combat aerial vehicle, commonly referred to as a “drone,” is 
an “unmanned military aircraft of any size which carries and launches a 
weapon, or which can use on-board technology to direct such a weapon to 
a target.”88 The use of UCAVs has dramatically grown over the past dec-
                                                                                                                      
86. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 33; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, 
art. 57(3). 
87. However, the risk to military personnel must still be balanced against the risk of 
collateral damage. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(q) cmt. 5 
(“[W]hereas a particular course of action may be considered non-feasible due to military 
considerations (such as excessive risks to aircraft and their crews), some risks have to be 
accepted in light of humanitarian considerations.”). 
88. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(ee). Within the U.S. Air Force unmanned 
aerial vehicles are commonly referred to as “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPA). U.S. Air 
Force, AFDD 1-02, Air Force Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of 
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ade, a trend which is certain to continue.89 This is understandable in light of 
their ability to employ precision weapons using enhanced ISR capabilities 
in an operation that poses no risk to the aircrew conducting the mission.  
While the law of armed conflict principles and rules discussed in Part 
III apply with equal force to UCAV operations,90 the unique precision ca-
pabilities UCAVs offer commanders influence their application, especially 
with regard to the requirement to take precautions in attack. The fact that a 
UCAV sortie poses no risk to the aircrew enhances the feasibility of their 
use in high-threat environments, thereby increasing the precision of the 
strike itself and making possible attacks on alternative targets that might 
not otherwise be viable. Onboard ISR capabilities, such as sensors and 
cameras, and the ability of UCAVs to loiter over a target for extended peri-
ods, bolster their ability to identify a target. UCAV ISR capabilities also 
minimize the likelihood, or degree, of collateral damage by making possible 
execution of the attack when civilians and civilian objects are least likely to 
be harmed. Additionally, UCAVs are armed only with precision weaponry, 
thereby providing commanders an effective option when selecting methods 
and means of warfare with the goal of minimizing civilian harm in mind. 
 
B. Automated Weapon Systems 
 
Developments in automated weapons technology have led some States to 
“envision a world in which humans need not be in the decision loop.”91 
                                                                                                                      
Military and Associated Terms (Jan. 11, 2007, incorporating Change 1, Jan 6. 2012), availa-
ble at https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd1-2.pdf. 
89. For example, the Department of Defense is dramatically increasing reliance on 
UCAVs and other drones. Adam Entous et al., More Drones, Fewer Troops, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Jan. 27, 2012, at 10. 
90. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (Armed Drones) and 
International Humanitarian Law:  Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 595, 609 (2012); Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings ¶ 79, Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), avail-
able at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24 
.Add6.pdf (“[A] missile fired from a drone is no different from any other commonly used 
weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires missiles. 
The critical legal question is the same for each weapon: whether its specific use complies 
with [international humanitarian law].”). 
91. U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND, UNMANNED EFFECTS (UFX): TAKING THE HU-
MAN OUT OF THE LOOP 4 (2003). See also U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYS-
TEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047, at 41 (2009).  
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Such “fully autonomous weapon systems” would be capable of identifying 
potential targets, selecting them for attack and striking them without hu-
man interface.92 Armed forces around the world are extremely interested in 
these systems since the operation of manned weapon systems can be per-
sonnel intensive and dangerous, while systems that are operated remotely, 
such as UCAVs, are vulnerable to communications jamming or cyber at-
tack.   
Fully autonomous weapon systems must be distinguished from other 
systems. For example, “human-supervised” autonomous systems—such as 
Israel’s Iron Dome—have been in operation for years.93 These systems 
have a “human in the loop” that closely monitors an engagement and can 
override the system if needed. Certain other weapon systems such as the 
“close-in weapon system”94 can be programmed to operate autonomously, 
but are presently used solely for point defense in accordance with very nar-
row fixed parameters.   
The fact that autonomous weapon systems have become both militarily 
desirable and technologically feasible is spawning interest in the legal issues 
surrounding their use.95 Indeed, Human Rights Watch has asserted the 
weapon systems would be “unable to meet legal standards” and therefore 
                                                                                                                      
92. An autonomous weapons system is defined as:  
 
a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous 
weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of 
the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input 
after activation. 
 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoDD 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 13–14 
(Nov. 21, 2012).   
93. Iron Dome can operate automatically using programmed parameters, but the sys-
tem also allows for human operator intervention. Inbal Orpaz, How Does Iron Dome Oper-
ate?, HAARETZ (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/how-does-the-
iron-dome-work.premium-1.478988.  
94. See generally U.S. Navy, MK 15—Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2.   
95. See  generally  Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autono-
mous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOUR-
NAL 231 (2013); Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, 
176 POLICY REVIEW (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review 
/article/135336; Markus Wagner, Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International 
Humanitarian Law, 21 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION AND SCIENCE 155 (2011). 
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“should be banned.”96 Pronouncements of illegality are premature at best 
and more likely simply wrong. As with most weapon systems, the principal 
normative issues involve use of the systems, not their possible status as un-
lawful weapons per se. Unsurprisingly, most of the challenging legal ques-
tions bear on the degree of precision the systems might be able to achieve. 
For example, Human Rights Watch contends that autonomous weap-
ons violate the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks because “[f]ully au-
tonomous weapon systems would not have the ability to sense or interpret 
the difference between soldiers and civilians, especially in contemporary 
combat environments.”97 There are two problems with this statement.  
First, it ignores the fact that some battlespaces contain no civilian persons 
or objects. In such environments, fully autonomous systems that are unable 
to identify civilian persons or objects could still be used without violating 
the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks because there is no chance of 
harming civilian persons or objects. Second, and perhaps more important-
ly, the statement assumes that no technological developments will afford 
fully autonomous systems an ability to distinguish between military and 
civilian personnel and objects.98 This is a curious stance since the ability of 
weapon systems to discriminate on the battlefield has been growing expo-
nentially due to technological advances, often in ways that seemed unimag-
inable only a few years earlier.  
The ability of autonomous weapon systems to comply with the princi-
ple of proportionality has likewise been questioned.99 If there is no “human 
in the loop,” the weapon system would have to both estimate the likely col-
lateral damage and determine whether that damage is excessive relative to 
                                                                                                                      
96. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER RO-
BOTS 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-
0. 
97. Id. at 30.   
98. The current state of technology already allows computers to recognize many 
things: 
Modern sensors can, inter alia, assess the shape and size of objects, determine their 
speed, identify the type of propulsion being used, determine the material of which 
they are made, listen to the object and its environs, and intercept associated commu-
nications or other electronic emissions. They can also collect additional data on other 
objects or individuals in the area and, depending on the platform with which they are 
affiliated, monitor a potential target for extended periods in order to gather infor-
mation that will enhance the reliability of identification and facilitate target engage-
ment when the risk of collateral damage is low. 
Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 95, at 297. 
99. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 96, at 32. 
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the military advantage anticipated to result from the attack. While critics 
rightly suggest that current technology is incapable of performing this task, 
future autonomous weapon systems will likely be programmable to per-
form analysis similar to the collateral damage estimate methodology 
(CDEM)100 currently used to determine the likelihood of harm to civilians 
or civilian objects in a target area. After all, CDEM relies on objective data 
and scientific algorithms. The resulting collateral damage estimate could 
then be used as the basis for “proportionality red lines” which, given the 
type of target being engaged, would preclude attack based on pre-
programmed criteria.   
The potential use of these weapons raises difficult legal questions. 
However, until the degree of precision they can achieve becomes clearer, 
any ban on their use would be rash. Indeed, it is conceivable that future 
fully autonomous systems might be more precise and better able to distin-
guish lawful targets from civilians and civilian objects than their manned or 
remotely operated counterparts.  
 
C. Cyber Attacks 
 
Cyber attacks launched from or through airborne platforms are by their 
very nature accurate. As with more traditional precision airstrikes, cyber 
attacks will almost always involve extensive C4ISR capabilities.  Not only 
are advanced computer and communications capabilities required to mount 
these attacks, but increased cyber security has made cyber intelligence, sur-
veillance and reconnaissance essential because the potential vulnerabilities 
of any target system must be identified and understood before effective 
exploitation is possible. Furthermore, attacking those vulnerabilities may 
require computer code specifically designed to exploit a particular vulnera-
bility.  
The law of armed conflict principles and rules discussed in Part III ap-
ply only to those cyber operations that qualify as an “attack.”101 As a term 
of art in the law of armed conflict, an attack is defined as “an act of vio-
                                                                                                                      
100. For a discussion of the methodology, see Defense Intelligence Agency General 
Counsel, Briefing: Joint Targeting Cycle and Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology 
(CDM), Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dod/drone_dod_ACLU 
_DRONES_JOINT_STAFF_SLIDES_1-47.pdf. 
101. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR-
FARE, ch. 4, § 2, cmts. 1–3 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].  
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lence, whether in offence or in defence.”102 This includes non-kinetic oper-
ations, such as computer operations that “result in death, injury, damage or 
destruction of persons or objects.”103   
In the absence of State practice, all predictions as to how the law of 
armed conflict will eventually shape the use of cyber attacks remain highly 
speculative. That said, it is probable that the extant law will, as it has with 
other new weapon systems, generally suffice to govern cyber-weapon sys-
tems, albeit with some interpretive accommodation for the unique charac-
teristics of cyberspace. In particular, the interconnectivity of military and 
civilian cyber systems may result in a greater demand for precision than is 
the case with kinetic weaponry. For instance, the prohibition on indiscrim-
inate attacks could in the future be interpreted to restrict the use of certain 
malware against military objectives that rely on dual-use (civilian/military) 
networks. Similarly, the precautions in attack rules may be interpreted to 
require a certain degree of target network mapping due to the risk of bleed- 
over into civilian systems.  
Due to the immense non-physical damage that cyber operations are ca-
pable of causing, it is also possible that, over time, the law of armed con-
flict will evolve in response. For example, it is conceivable that the current 
understanding of what constitutes an attack may expand to include certain 
cyber operations that do not cause physical injury or damage, thereby pro-
hibiting the directing of such operations at protected persons and objects.  
This sort of shift in understanding may similarly end up expanding what 
qualifies as collateral damage. Beyond any evolution in the application of 
current law of armed conflict principles, new prohibitions may also be 
adopted that provide special protection for certain civilian objects, such as 
critical infrastructure. Any of these potential changes—lowering the 
threshold for what constitutes an attack, expanding the definition of collat-
eral damage or adopting a new group of protected objects—would require 
heightened precision capabilities.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
102. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(e). Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 
49.  
103. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(e) cmt. 7.  See also TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 101, rule 30 (“[A] cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive 
or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or 
destruction to objects.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
  
Precision lies at the heart of both contemporary air warfare and the law of 
armed conflict rules that govern it. Precision capabilities increase an attack-
er’s ability to distinguish between military and civilian objectives, thereby 
fostering compliance with the principle of distinction. Furthermore, the 
accuracy and C4ISR capabilities that are integral to precision weaponry 
mean that such weapons cannot be deemed indiscriminate. On the contra-
ry, the increased ability to gather information about a target, distinguish 
lawful from unlawful targets and strike lawful targets with great accuracy 
help to ensure that attacks are neither indiscriminate nor violative of the 
principle of proportionality. Additionally, precision capabilities expand the 
means, methods and target options that are available to an attacker. This 
increases an attacker’s feasible options in planning and executing airstrikes, 
thereby increasing the influence of the precautions in attack rules on air 
operations. 
This does not mean that precision capabilities are a panacea. Of course, 
precision capabilities may be used in an unlawful manner. Perhaps most 
nefariously, precision can facilitate surgical strikes against protected per-
sons or places such as religious or political leaders, gatherings of particular 
ethnic groups or cultural property. But in general, precision capabilities 
contribute positively to humanitarian ends. 
While precision capabilities make possible attacks that the law of armed 
conflict would otherwise prohibit by limiting the risk of harm to civilians 
and civilian objects, such capabilities also act as a restraint on air operations 
in some situations. In particular, the requirements of precautions in attack 
may either mandate the use of precision capabilities before an attack is 
launched or prohibit an attack on an otherwise lawful target when another 
option is available that poses less risk to civilians or civilian objects. This is 
so even when the enemy may not be restricted in this manner, because it 
lacks precision systems. In other words, the law is relative; one side’s preci-
sion capabilities may prohibit it from conducting operations open to its 
enemy. 
In the future, demands for precision will unquestionably intensify. The 
expectations of the global community as to precision capabilities have 
grown steadily since the Vietnam conflict and show no sign of abating. On 
the contrary, the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan 
heightened expectations because they were so restrictive in terms of collat-
eral damage. The fact that operational and policy concerns, not legal con-
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straints, drove the restrictions has gone unnoticed by many. Additionally, 
the advent of unmanned and cyber systems, both of which offer precision 
capabilities not otherwise available on the battlefield, will further amplify 
expectations as the international law community begins to grasp their po-
tential to avoid civilian harm. Once this occurs, the interpretation and ap-
plication of law of armed conflict norms regarding targeting will inexorably 
evolve, as they always have, with advances in precision technology. 
 
